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Introduction and summary
Policymakers designing or changing a countrys tax
and transfer system aim at redistributing income and
supporting the living standards of low-income families,
while at the same time encouraging work effort and
economic self-sufficiency. Indeed, there is a tradeoff
between redistribution and efficiency: Economic
theory suggests that transferring more income to the
poor tends both to reduce their work effort and to
distort the economic decisions of those who are taxed
to provide the revenues that are being redistributed.
There are several reasons why a government might
want to redistribute income. Some of these are linked
to the fact that people face different opportunities
and different outcomes.
The government might want to provide insurance
to its citizens against different outcomes, for example,
sickness or unemployment, because in some cases
private markets cannot work well. Moreover, not
everybody enjoys the same opportunities in life; for
example, people from poor family backgrounds are
at a disadvantage relative to those from wealthier
backgrounds, and transfers are a way to partly offset
these differences.1
For historical and social reasons, different coun-
tries put different weights on the costs and benefits
of redistributing income. Traditionally, Anglo-Saxon
countries have a relatively low degree of government
intervention in the economy and place more empha-
sis on incentives, while in many European countries,
we see relatively more government redistribution,
greater provision of public goods, and more emphasis
on equality of opportunities and outcomes. Our goal
in this article is to look at different countries, study
their redistribution policies, and discuss the effects of
the redistribution/incentives tradeoff. Since we want
to look at countries that display different degrees of
government intervention, we pick countries belonging
to both traditions. We focus on a small number of
countries to study these issues in detail: the U.S.,
Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Finland. Our country
choices are also limited by the availability of compa-
rable data.
The link between the distribution of income and
taxes and transfers is a complex one. Households in
each country decide how hard to work, when to retire,
and how much to consume and save, taking into
account the incentives and disincentives provided by
the structure of taxes and transfers in their country.
Therefore, the distribution of labor income is itself
endogenous and the actual measure of taxes and
transfers depends on the labor and saving decisions
of the households. Moreover, the distribution of labor
income depends on the distribution of human capital,
and the government, for example, by subsiziding
education, can have an impact on it.2
We focus on distribution of income across work-
ing-age households in these five countries because
we are interested in labor income (earnings) inequality,
abstracting from normal retirement decisions. In fact,
at some age most people are retired and their labor
income drops while their gross income is supple-
mented by social security payments, pensions, and
other income sources. Looking only at households of
working age, however, we ignore another important
aspect of redistribution: social security transfers to
older people.3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
We study income inequality in these five countries
and use different income measures to compare the
redistributive consequences of taxes and transfers.
We also discuss their likely effects on the households
labor, early retirement, and savings decisions. The
distinction between transfers and taxes is interesting
because transfers are typically not just connected to
income, but may be means tested (both asset and
income based) or based on a specific condition (for
example, being unemployed or a single parent). Taxes
are typically not related to means testing and depend
much less on specific conditions. They rely mostly
on income as the screening signal. Different mixes
of taxes and transfers thus correspond to different
screening mechanisms employed by each country in
redistributing resources and, possibly, different redis-
tributive goals.
All of the measures of income we look at are
unequally distributed across countries and their dis-
tributions are concentrated and skewed. The U.S.
displays the most unequal labor income distribution
among the five countries, followed by Finland, Canada,
Sweden, and Germany in that order. As we mentioned
above, the distribution of labor income depends on
the tax and transfer system, as well as on the distri-
bution of human capital. Human capital is linked to
education, which in turn is influenced by government
subsidies. It is interesting to see that, as a result of all
of these forces, the distribution of labor earnings in
the countries that traditionally have been more con-
cerned with redistribution (Finland and Sweden) is
not necessarily more equal than it is in countries that
belong to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of low govern-
ment intervention (the U.S. and perhaps Canada).
Finland is one obvious example of a country with
high government intervention and high labor income
inequality. Our research indicates that this is partly
due to a more pronounced pattern of early retirement
in Finland than in all of the other countries. Also,
economic theory suggests that unemployment bene-
fits discourage job search and work effort. This could
translate into a larger number of unemployed or under-
employed, which increases measured inequality in
labor earnings.
Even after taxes and transfers, the U.S. displays
by far the most unequal distribution for disposable
income, followed by Canada, Germany, Finland, and
Sweden. According to our data, and consistent with
the distinction we discussed above, Finland reduces
labor income inequality the most, followed by Sweden,
Canada, Germany, and the U.S. Interestingly, Germany
engages in little redistribution, but has the most equal
distribution of labor earnings among these countries.
Not only do governments redistribute income
differently, but they also use different instruments. In
order to reduce labor income inequality, Finland and
Sweden rely on a very progressive transfer system,
while their tax system turns out to be very close to
proportional (that is, close to a flat tax rate regime).
At the opposite extreme, the U.S. uses taxes and
transfers with approximately the same degree of pro-
gressivity. Canada and Germany are somewhere in
between these extremes, with Canada relying more
heavily on progressive transfers than Germany.
The progressivity of the tax and transfer systems
is an important indicator of the resulting distortions
in households economic decisions. Another important
indicator is given by the total amount of resources re-
distributed by the government in each country. As
a measure, we can use the income tax faced by the
average working age household. In our samples the
average income tax rates are 16 percent in the U.S.,
17 percent in Germany, 21 percent in Canada, 23
percent in Finland, and 25 percent in Sweden. In this
sample, the countries with higher average income tax
(Finland and Sweden) are also the ones with the least
progressive tax systems. Government transfers (social
insurance plus means-tested) as a fraction of gross
income for the average working age household provide
the same ordering of magnitude for redistribution as the
average income tax. The average fractions of govern-
ment transfers are 3 percent in the U.S., 6 percent in
Germany, 8 percent in Canada, 15 percent in Finland,
and 19 percent in Sweden.
We also look at the impact of transfers, conditional
on the labor earnings level. For those in the bottom
10 percent of the labor earnings distribution in the
U.S. and Canada, means-tested transfers, rather than
social insurance transfers, are the main source of
gross income. In contrast, in the other countries,
and especially in Sweden, the main source of gross
income for the poorest segment of the population is
in the form of social insurance transfers.
Looking at the structure of earnings and transfers
over the life cycle within each country, we find
evidence that Finland and Sweden provide stronger
incentives toward early retirement because of both
social security and the structure of pension schemes.
This explains some of the inequality we observe in
the labor earnings distribution in these two countries;
once people retire, their labor earnings drop. At the
opposite extreme, our data suggest that there is less
incentive to retire early in Germany and the U.S.
Our findings are thus consistent with the predic-
tion from economic theory that greater redistribution
through taxes and transfers is achieved at the cost of4 Economic Perspectives
greater distortions on labor supply and early retirement
decisions. Consistent with other theoretical work, we
also find that high redistribution countries rely heavily
on instruments other than income taxes, such as
transfers based on special conditions or means testing,
to achieve high levels of redistribution while keeping
distortions as low as possible for the beneficiaries.3
This, however, is costly because it generates the need
to monitor eligibility. For example, Sweden has special
agencies that monitor the job search efforts of the
unemployed.
Germany is an interesting case. The level of redis-
tribution through taxes and transfers is low. However,
the distribution of labor earnings in Germany is remark-
ably more equal than in the other countries we con-
sider here. Evidently the government is using other
instruments to achieve this level of equality, possibly
more equal access to public education. Another rea-
son the distribution of earnings may be more equal is
the presence of powerful unions, which typically
favor a flat wage structure that enhances security at
the expense of incentives.
Definitions of income
In this section we review the different definitions
of income we use throughout the article and the
information they convey. Our unit of analysis is the
household, and the first measure of income we consid-
er is labor income (earnings). This includes gross
wage, salary income, and farm and nonfarm self-em-
ployment income.4 This measure provides us with in-
formation on the outcome of labor supply and early
retirement decisions. Observing a large number of
households with little or no earnings is an indication of
high unemployment and/or a low participation rate.
High levels of concentration in earnings might reflect
a more unequal distribution of human capital and
education in the population.
Our second measure of income is factor income
which, besides earnings, includes cash property income
(that is, cash interest, rents, dividends, and annuities)
and royalties, but excludes capital gains and all other
forms of lump-sum payments. Factor income, including
income from capital, gives us a more comprehensive
measure of income and provides indirect information
on peoples assets and, hence, saving decisions.
Another measure of income is gross income, which
adds social and private transfers to factor income. Gov-
ernment transfers might be an important channel
through which the government redistributes income.
Comparing the distribution of factor income with
the one for gross income, we can study the effects
of government transfers across different countries.
Finally, we calculate disposable income by
subtracting income taxes, mandatory employee con-
tributions, and mandatory contributions for the self-
employed from gross income. Disposable personal
income provides a measure of the resources that
households can actually allocate to either savings or
consumption after taxes are paid and allows us to
compare the progressivity of tax systems across dif-
ferent countries.
All of our statistics are based on total family
income, without correcting for the number of family
members. We also performed the computations taking
into account family size to check whether different
demographic patterns across countries affect our con-
clusions. To do so, we followed the equivalence
scale literature and divided total family income for
each family by the total number of family components,
raised to the power a.5 This method is meant to take
into account that economies of scale arise as the size
of the household increases. Our conclusions were not
affected by this transformation.
The data
We use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
dataset. LIS collects existing household income sur-
veys data from 25 countries and makes them compa-
rable as much as possible in terms of data definition.
The LIS dataset for the U.S. is based on the March
Current Population Survey (CPS), the one for Canada
on the Survey of Consumer Finances, the one for
Germany on the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study, the one for Sweden on the Income Distribution
Survey, and the one for Finland on the Income Distri-
bution Survey. The LIS provides data in waves; most
of the datasets we use belong to the fourth wave. We
use 1994 data for the U.S., Canada, and Germany
and 1995 data for Finland. We use 1992 data for
Sweden, because the 1995 Swedish dataset is still
under revision.
The dataset has some limitations. These mainly
stem from the fact that the data for the various coun-
tries come from existing datasets and might differ in
the questions asked, their design, the definition of the
household, and other important dimensions. While
LIS aims at harmonizing the data so that the effect of
these discrepancies is reduced, some differences will
persist. Our minimum requirement to include a coun-
try was to have data on gross earnings, transfers, and
taxes. This criterion alone excluded many countries,
such as Italy and France, for which the only data
available are net of taxes.
We provide a technical description of the country-
specific datasets and their construction in the appendix.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
LIS does not provide this information for
the specific waves we use. We still report it,
indicating to which year it refers, since it
provides insight on the quality of the data
across countries.
An overview of income inequality
across countries
As we said earlier, we are interested in
labor income inequality and redistribution.
We do not have data on retirement status
for all countries. Therefore, we concentrate
on households whose head is of working
age (25 to 60 years old, table 1). To study
the possible effects of different patterns of
early retirement on the income distribution,
we also look at the subset of families whose
head is 25 to 50 years of age (table 2). This
will make quite a difference in the income
distribution of some of the countries we
consider but it will not matter much for
others. We provide evidence in a later sec-
tion that this is, indeed, related to early
retirement decisions.
Tables 1 and 2 show that for both sub-
samples, earnings, factor income, gross
income, and disposable income are unequally
distributed across households in all of the
countries and their distributions are con-
centrated and skewed (there are a large
number of people with little and a small
number of people with really large income
of any type). The tables also show that
governments redistribute with different
strength and using different instruments.
The first column of each table reports
the fraction of people with zero or negative
earnings, factor income, gross income, and
disposable income. In the dataset, all of the people
with negative earnings are households with self-
employment income in financial trouble.6
Looking at table 1 we see that the fraction of
households at zero or negative earnings varies some-
what across these countries, with Finland having the
highest fraction (9.7 percent) and Germany the lowest
(7.0 percent). However, once all sources of income
are taken into account and taxes are subtracted, this
fraction drops below 1 percent for all countries, with
the U.S. having the highest fraction of households
with zero or negative disposable income (.9 percent)
and Finland the lowest (.1 percent). Comparing the
number of people with zero or negative earnings and
factor income, we see that in all countries the fraction
of people in this category falls when cash property
income is added.7 Most of the people at negative
earnings are entrepreneurs in trouble who are experi-
encing (possibly temporary) losses but still have cap-
ital income from their investments; this explains the
bulk of the reduction in the number of people at zero
or negative factor income, compared with zero or
negative earnings. Moreover, comparing table 1 with
table 2, we see that the heads of some of the house-
holds at zero earnings are older than 50, so they might
be in early retirement, and have some income from
assets, pensions, and social security transfers. Look-
ing at gross income, we see how private and public
transfers reduce the number of people at zero or neg-
ative gross income across all countries. Most of this
reduction is due to public transfers.
TABLE 1




Country and variable or negative Gini p80/p20 of mean
United States
Earnings 7.7 0.46 23 60
Factor income 6.1 0.46 23 61
Gross income 0.9 0.42 12 62
Disposable income 0.9 0.39 9 60
Canada
Earnings 8.9 0.42 24 56
Factor income 7.7 0.42 22 56
Gross income 0.2 0.35 8 58
Disposable income 0.2 0.32 6 56
Germany
Earnings 7.0 0.38 13 56
Factor income 6.2 0.39 14 57
Gross income 0.2 0.34 7 59
Disposable income 0.2 0.30 5 58
Sweden
Earnings 7.6 0.39 19 56
Factor income 3.7 0.39 17 57
Gross income 0.3 0.29 5 54
Disposable income 0.3 0.27 4 53
Finland
Earnings 9.7 0.43 39 56
Factor income 7.8 0.44 36 57
Gross income 0.0 0.32 6 57
Disposable income 0.1 0.29 5 55
Notes: The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality which varies
between 0 and 1. 0 indicates perfect equality. 1 indicates perfect
inequality (see box 1). The variable p80/p20 is a measure of social
distance. It measures the ratio of the average income of the richest
and poorest 20 percent of the population.
Sources: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for the U.S.,
Canada, and Germany, Differdange, Luxembourg: Centre for Population,
Poverty, and Policy Studies; 1995, dataset for Finland; and 1992,
dataset for Sweden.
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The second column reports the Gini coefficient
(see box 1), which is a measure of inequality. The U.S.
displays the highest concentration for all income mea-
sures, Germany has the least concentrated earnings
distribution, and Sweden has the least concentration
in the gross and disposable income distributions.8
There is some evidence that Germany achieves redis-
tribution using some other mechanism that makes
labor earnings more equal.
The drop in the Gini index from one row to the
next measures the reduction in inequality. We see that
Finland achieves more redistribution (its Gini coeffi-
cient for disposable income is 34 percent lower than
its Gini coefficient for factor income), most of which
comes from transfers. Sweden is quite close to Finland,
both in the size of the redistribution and
the use of transfers to achieve it. At the
opposite extreme, in the U.S. the com-
bined effect of taxes and transfers reduces
the factor income Gini coefficient by 15
percent, and transfers cause only about
half of the reduction. Canada and Germany
are somewhere in between, with Canada
relying more heavily on transfers than
Germany.
The fourth column of the tables reports
another measure of concentration. Let us
take earnings: p80/p20 is the ratio between
the total earnings of the richest 20 percent,
divided by the total earnings of the poorest
20 percent. This is a measure of social dis-
tance, comparing the richest population
segment with the poorest.9
In table 1, the p80/p20 earnings ratio
varies between a high of 39 for Finland
and a low of 13 for Germany. The ratio
in Finland is high not because the richest
people make more here than in the other
countries, but because the average earn-
ings of the poorest 20 percent are low
compared with the other countries. After
taxes and transfers, the p80/p20 ratio for
disposable income falls noticeably. In all
countries but the U.S. this is mostly due
to transfer systems that increase signifi-
cantly the gross income of the poorest,
rather than to tax systems that reduce more
than proportionally the average disposable
income of the richest. The p80/p20 for
disposable income is highest in the U.S.
(9) and lowest in Sweden (4).
Comparing table 1 and table 2, we
see that restricting our sample to house-
holds whose head is 50 and younger makes a differ-
ence, especially for Finland, Canada, and Sweden.
For example, p80/p20, the measure of social distance
from richest 20 percent to poorest 20 percent, drops
from 39 to 21 for Finland when we change the upper
age limit from 60 to 50. However, it makes little
difference for the U.S and no difference for Germany.
This suggests that people might retire earlier in some
countries than in others. According to the Gini coef-
ficient for earnings reported in table 2, the U.S. is
still the country with the highest earnings inequality,
followed by Canada, Finland, Sweden, and Germany.
The last column, percentile location of mean, pro-
vides information on the skewness of the distribution.
TABLE 2




Country and variable or negative Gini p80/p20 of mean
Concentration
United States
Earnings 6.8 0.45 21 59
Factor income 5.8 0.45 21 61
Gross income 0.9 0.42 11 62
Disposable income 0.9 0.38 9 60
Canada
Earnings 7.6 0.41 19 55
Factor income 7.1 0.40 18 56
Gross income 0.2 0.34 7 57
Disposable income 0.2 0.31 6 56
Germany
Earnings 5.9 0.38 12 56
Factor income 5.4 0.38 12 56
Gross income 0.0 0.34 6 58
Disposable income 0.0 0.30 5 57
Sweden
Earnings 6.7 0.39 17 57
Factor income 3.5 0.39 16 57
Gross income 0.3 0.29 4 54
Disposable income 0.3 0.27 4 53
Finland
Earnings 7.2 0.40 21 56
Factor income 6.3 0.41 20 57
Gross income 0.0 0.31 5 57
Disposable income 0.1 0.28 4 54
Notes: The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality which varies
between 0 and 1. 0 indicates perfect equality. 1 indicates perfect
inequality (see box 1). The variable p80/p20 is a measure of social
distance. It measures the ratio of the average income of the richest
and poorest 20 percent of the population.
Sources: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for the U.S.,
Canada, and Germany, Differdange, Luxembourg: Centre for Population,
Poverty, and Policy Studies; 1995, dataset for Finland; and 1992,
dataset for Sweden.7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
This measure reveals that in the U.S. the distribu-
tions are more skewed, both before and after taxes
and transfers. The distributions of earnings and factor
income are similarly skewed in Canada, Germany,
Sweden, and Finland, while Sweden displays less
skewness in its distribution of disposable income.
BOX 1
Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient
The Lorenz curve provides information on inequali-
ty. To draw it, we first sort the households by their
income, starting with the ones with the lowest in-
come. We then plot the relationship between the
cumulative percentage of the population (on the
horizontal axis) and the proportion of total income
earned by each cumulative percentage (on the verti-
cal axis). Figures a and b show the Lorenz curve
for the two extreme cases of perfect equality and
highest inequality. In the case of perfect equality
share of total income
percent of households, ranked by amount
a. Perfect equality
share of total income
percent of households, ranked by amount
b. Perfect inequality
everybody earns the same proportion of total income,
and the Lorenz curve coincides with the 45-degree
line (see figure a). In the case of perfect inequality,
just one family earns all of the total income in the
economy. All households except the last one earn
no income, and hence the cumulative proportion of
income earned stays at zero. The Lorenz curve
stays flat until the very last household is reached;
then it jumps to 100, since the last family earns all
of the income in the economy.
In real life we observe intermediate cases, in
which some households earn more and others less,
and the Lorenz curve lies between the perfect
equality and the perfect inequality lines (figure c).
share of total income
percent of households, ranked by amount
c. Intermediate case
The Gini coefficient is a summary statistic of
inequality derived from the Lorenz curve. It is de-
fined as the ratio of area A (see figure c: the area
between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality
line) to area A + B (the area between the perfect
equality and perfect inequality lines). The Gini
coefficient varies between zero and one; it is equal
to zero in the case of perfect equality (every house-
hold earns the same) and equal to one in the case
of perfect inequality (one household earns every-
thing). Therefore, the Gini coefficient provides a
summary measure of inequality over the whole
range of the distribution.
Using Lorenz curves to better
understand inequality
Figure 1 compares the Lorenz curve for earnings
across the five countries. As we explain in box 1, the
Lorenz curve provides more information than the Gini
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interesting to observe not only the ordering of the
curves for the various countries (the ones that lie to
the right are the farthest from the 45-degree line and
thus indicate a country with more inequali-
ty), but also whether the lines cross and
where. Until the thirty-fifth percentile,
Finland is the country in which the poorest
families earn the smallest fraction of total
earnings. From that percentile on, the U.S.
emerges as having greater income inequal-
ity than Finland or any of the other coun-
tries we study.
Economic theory (for a survey, see
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) suggests
that workers labor decisions depend,
among other things, on the social security
safety net that is in place: In countries with
more generous social insurance systems
(such as unemployment benefits), workers
will be pickier and there will be more peo-
ple with zero earnings, since they receive
transfers from the government. In this case,
the workers are deciding not to work, or
not to work for a longer period because of
the availability of benefits; thus, they may
be better off than the workers in countries
that do not offer such generous benefits.
The incentives to retire early also affect the
number of people at low levels of earn-
ings.10 These incentives differ across
countries, and we provide evidence that
they are particularly strong in Finland.
Looking at the earnings of households
between the fortieth and eightieth percen-
tiles, the ordering of the countries from
most equal to most unequal is Germany,
Sweden, Canada, Finland, and the U.S.
Figure 2 displays the Lorenz curves
for gross income across the five coun-
tries.11 After adding private and govern-
ment transfers, the U.S. displays the most
concentrated distribution by far for all
percentiles. Until the eighty-fifth percen-
tile, the ordering of gross income inequality
from the most equal to the most unequal
is Sweden, Finland, Germany, Canada,
and the U.S. After adding transfers, the
poorest people in the other countries are
noticeably better off than in the U.S. This
is not the case for the earnings distribu-
tions in figure 1. As we discussed for table
1, transfers go a long way in redistributing
income, especially at the lower levels of
earnings. For all countries but the U.S. and Germany,
they are the instrument most used to redistribute
income. However, economic theory predicts that a
FIGURE 1
Lorenz curve for earnings
share of total income





Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
Finland
FIGURE 2
Lorenz curve for gross income
share of total income





Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
Finland9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 3
Lorenz curve for disposable income
share of total income





Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
Finland
FIGURE 4
Lorenz curve for U.S.
share of total income




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
FIGURE 5
Lorenz curve for Canada
share of total income




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
generous transfer system influences labor supply and
early retirement decisions, increasing the number of
people at zero earnings and reducing labor supply even
at higher levels.
Figure 3 shows the Lorenz curves for disposable
income. As in figure 2, the Lorenz curve for the U.S.
is by far the most concentrated at all percentiles. The
Lorenz curves for Sweden, Finland, and Germany
are closer than the ones for gross earn-
ings and almost coincide for the poorest
60 percent of the population. High redis-
tribution countries rely heavily on instru-
ments other than income taxes, such as
transfers based on special conditions or
means testing, to achieve high levels of
redistribution while keeping distortions
as low as possible for the beneficiaries.
As we mentioned earlier, however, this
is costly because it generates the need to
monitor eligibility.
Figures 4 to 8 display the Lorenz
curves for earnings, gross income, and dis-
posable income within each country. Com-
paring the figures, we see that the U.S. and
Germany redistribute income across house-
holds using transfers and taxes roughly
with the same intensity, with transfers hav-
ing the strongest impact for families below
the median earner family and taxes becom-
ing more redistributive for families above
the twenty-fifth percentile. In Canada, the
effect of transfers shifts the Lorenz curve
for gross income more than it does in the
U.S. Both Sweden and Finland have very
high levels of redistributions by means of transfers,
also for families high up in the distribution, while taxa-
tion shifts the Lorenz curve relatively little in both cas-
es. We should notice that proportional taxation (income
is taxed at the same marginal rate, regardless of the in-
come level) and proportional transfers do not shift the
Lorenz curve and do not change the Gini coefficient.
Conversely, progressive taxation (higher income is10 Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 7
Lorenz curve for Sweden
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
FIGURE 8
Lorenz curve for Finland
share of total income




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
FIGURE 6
Lorenz curve for Germany
share of total income




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
taxed at a higher marginal rate) and transfers do. There-
fore, our comparison shows that the Swedish and Finn-
ish tax systems are effectively close to a proportional
tax and all of the progressivity is achieved through
transfers. Taxation is more progressive in the U.S.,
Canada, and Germany.
So far, we have discussed the progressivity of
the tax and transfer systems in our five countries
based on how they change the relative position of the
households in the income distribution. However, this
criterion does not give us much information about
the magnitude of the income that changes hands in
the economy. From the last columns of tables 3 to 7,
we can look at another measure of redistribution
within each country: aggregate taxes and transfers as
a fraction of aggregate gross income. Looking at this
criterion, we see that total transfers are 6 percent of
gross income of the working age families in the U.S.,
11 percent in Canada, 7 percent in Germany, 19 per-
cent in Sweden, and 21 percent in Finland. For income
taxes, the numbers are 16 percent, 21 percent,  17
percent, 25 percent, and 23 percent of gross income,
respectively. The magnitude of these flows provides
the same ordering of strength of redistribution across
countries suggested by the Lorenz curves and the
Gini coefficients.
Labor earnings and redistribution
Tables 3 to 7 provide more detail on earnings,
taxes, and transfers for households whose head is 25
to 60 years of age, conditional on labor earnings
quartiles. In each table, the columns provide informa-
tion about a number of households, classified according
to their relative position in the earnings distribution
of the total sample of households: the poorest 10
percent, the quartiles, the richest 10 percent, and the
population as a whole.12 We study average earnings,
gross income, and disposable income for the house-
holds in each category.13 To better understand how re-
distribution takes place within the quartiles of the
earnings distribution, we also analyze the sources of
disposable income and tax payments.
We distinguish among various income sources.
The first three are gross wage and salary income11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 3
U.S. households ranked by earnings
Households in earnings quartiles
Household characteristics Bottom 10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Top 10% Total
Earnings, in dollars
Average earnings 275 6,009 24,494 43,415 89,184 122,085 40,676
Average gross income 9,448 12,295 27,220 46,352 94,395 129,545 44,965
Average disposable income 9,090 11,320 22,791 37,016 68,258 89,275 34,773
Sources of gross income, %
Labor 2.7 45.2 84.5 88.4 87.6 85.9 84.4
Business 0.2 3.6 5.5 5.3 6.9 8.4 6.0
Cash property income 10.7 6.1 2.5 2.6 3.9 4.6 3.5
Total transfers 86.4 45.1 7.6 3.7 1.6 1.2 6.0
Social insurance 26.3 16.5 3.5 1.6 0.7 0.4 2.4
Means-tested 37.4 15.9 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.3
Pensions 13.4 7.1 1.7 1.2 0.7 0.6 1.4
Private 7.3 4.8 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.8
Income tax, % 3.5 4.0 9.4 13.0 21.3 25.2 16.2
Average number of earners 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.5
Average household size 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.3 2.7
Age of household head, %
25–34 32.6 37.9 38.2 29.4 17.1 13.3 30.7
35–49 39.2 39.8 43.5 49.7 56.9 57.4 47.5
50–60 28.2 22.3 18.2 20.9 26.0 29.3 21.8
Average age, years 41.4 39.8 39.3 40.9 43.4 44.4 40.8
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for the U.S., Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
(labor), income from self-employment (business),
and cash property income. We then distinguish among
several transfer components. Social insurance trans-
fers include sick, accident, and disability pay, social
retirement benefits (even if the household head is of
working age, he or she may go into early retirement
or another family member might receive such pay-
ments), child or family allowances, unemployment
compensation, maternity pay, military/veteran/war
benefits, and other social insurance. Means-tested
transfers include both cash and near-cash benefits.14
Pensions include private pensions and public sector
pensions. Private pensions are employer payments
for retirement that may supplement social security
transfers. Self-employment pension plans are included,
if they are designed to supplement social security,
for example, individual retirement accounts (IRAs).
Public sector pensions include pensions for public
employees and do not include amounts coming from
social security benefits for the aged or survivors.
Private transfers include alimony or child support
and other regular private income.
We then report income taxes. We do not have
information on employee and self-employed
contributions for all five countries. The comparison
between income tax rates is likely to carry over to the
entire tax system, as the income tax is the most pro-
gressive component of the tax code.
We also report some demographic characteristics
of households in the different earnings quartiles.
The U.S.
As table 3 shows, the average household at the
bottom 10 percent of the earnings distribution in the
U.S. earns $275 from labor income, which amounts to
a disposable income of $9,090 after taxes and transfers.
Less than 3 percent of the households gross income
comes from earnings, while 86.4 percent derives
from transfers. For this group, means-tested transfers
account for the largest share of transfers (37.4 percent),
followed by social insurance (26.3 percent) and pen-
sions (13.4 percent). Consistent with the observation
that lifetime earnings follow an inverted U shape, the
10 percent of households with the lowest earnings
include a disproportionate share of the youngest and
oldest population segments. Young people are still
accumulating human capital and trying to climb up
the earnings distribution. The relatively high fraction12 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 4
Canadian households ranked by earnings
Households in earnings quartiles
Household characteristics Bottom 10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Top 10% Total
Earnings, in U.S. dollars
Average earnings 68 5,088 22,753 37,856 68,148 88,188 33,408
Average gross income 11,004 13,472 27,281 40,972 71,363 91,807 38,230
Average disposable income 10,412 12,449 22,982 32,570 53,112 66,075 30,246
Sources of gross income
Labor 0.5 32.7 76.5 87.4 88.1 86.3 80.9
Business 0.1 5.1 6.9 5.0 7.4 9.8 6.5
Cash property income 6.4 4.7 2.0 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.9
Total transfers 93.0 57.6 14.6 6.2 2.8 2.0 10.7
Social insurance 30.6 26.5 10.1 4.4 1.7 1.0 6.1
Means-tested 41.3 18.4 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.9
Pensions 14.1 7.4 1.7 0.8 0.4 0.3 1.4
Private 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income tax, % 5.4 7.6 15.8 20.5 25.6 28.0 20.9
Average number of earners 0.1 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.6 1.7
Average household size 2.1 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.5 2.8
Age of household head, %
25–34 28.0 32.1 35.9 29.4 19.2 13.7 29.2
35–49 39.9 42.0 44.8 51.0 55.5 56.8 48.3
50–60 32.2 25.9 19.3 19.5 25.3 29.5 22.5
Average age, years 43.0 41.3 39.8 40.7 43.1 44.4 41.2
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for Canada, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
of older people (50 to 60 years old) among the low-
est earners suggests that a significant number of peo-
ple in our sample are taking early retirement. As we
mentioned earlier, this is a common feature across
countries, although it is much more common in Finland
and Sweden.
Looking at the overall distribution, we see that
transfers decline quickly as earnings increase, with
means-tested transfers declining even more quickly.
The share of pensions also declines throughout the
distribution.
The structure of taxation is very progressive,
with the average tax rate going from 3.5 percent for
the poorest 10 percent, to 25 percent for the richest
10 percent. However, the average tax rate in the U.S.
is low, compared with the other countries we look at.
Canada
Table 4 shows that Canada has a more generous
transfer system than the U.S. Both social insurance
and means-tested transfers are larger in Canada, but
while social insurance transfers decline more slowly
as earnings increase, means-tested ones do so more
quickly, as households in the second quartile of both
distributions receive less than 1 percent of their gross
income from this source. The share of pension income
across the distribution looks remarkably similar to the
one in the U.S. even though in Canada the fraction of
people between 50 and 60 years of age is larger.
The Canadian income tax regime is almost as
progressive as the U.S. one. In particular, households
at the top 10 percent of the distribution pay an aver-
age income tax of 28 percent, compared with 25 per-
cent in the U.S., although for the whole population
the average rate is 21 percent in Canada and 16 per-
cent in the U.S.
Germany
The fraction of gross income coming from gov-
ernment transfers (social insurance plus means-tested)
for the average household in the total population is
6.4 percent, compared with 3.7 percent in the U.S.
and 8 percent in Canada. Interestingly, at the bottom
10 percent of the earnings distribution the share of
transfers due to social insurance is larger than the
means-tested share in Germany, unlike in the U.S.
and Canada.13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 5
German households ranked by earnings
Households in earnings quartiles
Household characteristics Bottom 10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Top 10% Total
Earnings, in U.S. dollars
Average earnings 867 9,174 30,275 45,496 80,412 106,831 41,333
Average gross income 14,926 18,247 33,344 48,394 84,407 113,440 46,092
Average disposable income 13,584 15,602 24,236 33,921 54,320 70,518 32,016
Sources of gross income, %
Labor 5.6 44.6 86.9 87.4 85.5 80.6 82.2
Business 0.2 5.7 3.9 6.6 9.8 13.6 7.5
Cash property income 21.4 8.2 1.3 2.0 3.1 4.7 3.0
Total transfers 72.8 41.6 7.9 4.0 1.6 1.1 7.3
Social insurance 36.8 23.4 6.2 3.1 1.3 0.9 4.8
Means-tested 23.5 11.9 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.6
Pensions 3.3 1.9 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3
Private 9.3 4.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6
Income tax, % 8.7 6.4 11.5 14.6 22.9 27.4 17.0
Average number of earners 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.5
Average household size 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.6
Age of household head, %
25–34 37.2 39.4 38.0 29.3 19.8 10.7 31.6
35–49 29.7 31.8 36.8 46.0 49.5 51.7 41.0
50–60 33.1 28.8 25.1 24.7 30.7 37.7 27.3
Average age, years 42.0 40.8 40.4 41.5 43.9 45.9 41.7
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for Germany, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
The share of gross income due to pensions is low
in Germany; for example, at the bottom 10 percent it is
only 3.3 percent, compared with about 14 percent in
both the U.S. and Canada, despite the fact that the
share of people ages 50 to 60 is larger in Germany.
This reflects the fact that the German social security
system is much less redistributive than in the other
countries (see Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1999), so
the share of payments that goes to the poorest seg-
ment of the population is lower.
As we said before, Germany is the country with
the second least generous transfer system after the
U.S. It is also the country with the second lowest
average income tax, 17 percent of total gross income,
compared with 16 percent in the U.S., 21 percent in
Canada, and much higher rates in Sweden and Finland.
However, the bottom 10 percent of households pay
more taxes in Germany (8.7 percent) than in the U.S.
(3.5 percent) or Canada (5.4 percent).
Sweden
In Sweden, 19 percent of average household
gross income is due to transfers, compared with
6 percent in the U.S., 7 percent in Germany, and
11 percent in Canada.15
Comparing tables 6 and 3 we see that the Swedish
households at the bottom 10 percent of the earnings
distribution have $223 in average earnings, compared
with $275 in the U.S., but end up with an average
disposable income of $19,750, compared with $9,090
in the U.S. They thus receive 92 percent of their gross
income from transfers, the majority of which is social
assistance (this, however, includes public pensions
in Sweden), while a much smaller fraction is means
tested. Swedish social security transfers remain large
as earnings increase: The households in the top quar-
tile of the earnings distribution receive 5 percent of
their gross income from government transfers.
Correspondingly, the average income tax for the
whole population is also much larger (25 percent) than
in the countries we have discussed so far. Its structure
is not very progressive, starting from an average rate
of 16 percent for the bottom 10 percent up to 31 per-
cent for the richest 10 percent.14 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 6
Swedish households ranked by earnings
Households in earnings quartiles
Household characteristics Bottom 10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Top 10% Total
Earnings, in U.S. dollars
Average earnings 223 7,010 28,120 44,315 76,646 96,233 39,020
Average gross income 23,593 26,798 36,960 53,925 84,404 104,351 50,519
Average disposable income 19,750 21,806 28,178 40,821 60,203 71,928 37,750
Sources of gross income, %
Labor 0.8 23.5 73.7 79.4 88.9 90.2 74.9
Business 0.1 2.7 2.4 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.3
Cash property income 4.2 3.8 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.6
Total transfers 94.8 70.0 21.2 14.3 5.3 3.9 19.2
Social insurance 73.1 55.0 18.0 13.0 5.0 3.7 16.2
Means-tested 8.6 12.6 2.0 0.9 0.1 0.1 2.3
Pensions N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Private 3.1 2.5 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.7
Income tax, % 16.3 18.6 23.8 24.3 28.7 31.1 25.3
Average number of earners 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.5
Average household size 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.2
Age of household head, %
25–34 31.1 39.5 39.9 30.7 13.0 8.2 30.8
35–49 37.9 36.9 40.1 47.6 55.9 59.5 45.1
50–60 31.0 23.5 20.0 21.7 31.0 32.3 24.1
Average age, years 41.6 39.7 39.4 40.9 44.7 45.8 41.2
Note: N/A indicates not available.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1992, dataset for Sweden, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
Finland
As we see from table 7, in Finland as in Sweden,
the amount of transfer income is substantial and the
part due to social insurance is generous throughout
the earnings distribution. In Finland, however, means-
tested transfers are more generous than in Sweden,
and particularly so at low levels of earnings.
Unlike for Sweden, we do have disaggregated
data for pensions for Finland. It is striking to note
that pensions provide 36 percent of gross income for
the Finnish households at the bottom 10 percent of
the distribution and 22 percent for those in the bottom
25 percent. This is more than double the amounts for
the U.S and Canada and about ten times the level in
Germany. In Finland, 44 percent of household heads
age 50 to 60 are in the bottom 10 percent of the distri-
bution and 34 percent are in the bottom 25 percent,
compared with 25 percent in the total sample. A large
share of this pension income is due to public pensions.
The availability and generosity of public pensions in
Finland seems to encourage a large share of public
employees to retire early.
The average income tax rate and its progressivity
in Finland are very similar to those of Sweden. Finland
implemented a tax reform in the late 1980s (Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development
[OECD], 1991) that reduced marginal income tax
rates while maintaining total tax revenues by broad-
ening the income tax base and raising indirect
taxes. By 1992, the highest personal income tax rate
had been reduced from 51 percent to 39 percent. On
the other hand, and partially offsetting this reduction,
social security contributions paid by employers and
employees were increased. The OECD computed
that, taking increases in social security and consump-
tion taxes into account, the effective marginal tax rate
on total labor compensation did not change significantly.
We do not have data on consumption or consumption
taxes; therefore our computed tax payments should be
considered as lower bounds of the actual ones.
Age, early retirement, and income
In this section we look at gross income, taxes,
and transfers over the life cycle to study the relation-
ship between age and redistribution for working age
families (25 to 60 years of age).15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 7
Finnish households ranked by earnings
Households in earnings quartiles
Household characteristics Bottom 10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Top 10% Total
Earnings, in U.S. dollars
Average earnings 2 3,722 22,688 38,214 69,544 88,581 33,533
Average gross income 17,423 20,473 31,902 46,374 76,682 97,418 43,851
Average disposable income 14,532 16,783 23,743 32,694 49,611 60,534 30,703
Sources of gross income, %
Labor 0.0 15.2 64.5 75.0 79.3 76.5 68.0
Business 0.0 3.0 6.6 7.4 11.4 14.4 8.5
Cash property income 2.3 5.8 1.7 2.0 3.0 4.3 2.8
Total transfers 97.7 76.0 27.2 15.6 6.3 4.7 20.7
Social insurance 34.5 32.6 16.0 10.1 4.3 3.0 11.3
Means-tested 25.0 19.0 3.9 1.4 0.5 0.4 3.5
Pensions 36.5 22.1 6.0 3.2 1.0 0.8 5.0
Private 1.4 1.8 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.8
Income tax, % 13.6 14.7 19.5 22.6 27.7 30.3 23.4
Average number of earners 0.0 0.8 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.4 1.6
Average household size 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.4 2.6
Age of household head, %
25–34 15.8 28.4 37.9 29.2 15.3 11.0 27.7
35–49 39.9 37.5 40.2 50.7 59.9 59.5 47.1
50–60 44.3 34.2 22.0 20.1 24.7 29.4 25.3
Average age, years 46.5 43.2 39.9 41.1 43.6 44.7 42.0
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1995, dataset for Finland, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
In all countries average gross income follows an
inverse U-shape pattern, first increasing with age and
then declining as the household head gets older (tables
8 to 12). Total transfers follow a U-shape pattern:
They are more generous for younger and older
households. In fact, middle-age families on average
earn more and also hold more assets. As the family
gets older some of its members retire and begin re-
ceiving social security payments and pensions, there-
fore transfers increase. In all countries but Sweden
(for which we do not have data on private pen-
sions), total transfers to the age group 55 to 60 are
actually the highest over the life cycle. The fraction
of total transfers to this age group is smallest in the
U.S. and Germany (11 percent), larger in Canada
and Sweden (19 and 22 percent, respectively) and
largest in Finland (36 percent).
The incentives to retire early in the various
countries are reflected in tables 8 to 12 by the life
cycle pattern of the fraction of gross income due to
labor, self-employment, and total transfers. If the
fraction of total transfers rises significantly for the
last (or last two) age groups, while the fraction of
income from labor and self-employment goes down,
we have evidence that households are retiring early.
The case in which transfers go up and labor income
goes down while income from self-employment in-
creases indicates that while households are reducing
their labor and receiving social security and pension
payments, at the same time they are engaging in
some self-employment activity to supplement their
income. This is more likely to happen in countries
in which social security payments do not decrease
sharply when people receive some extra income, at
least up to some level.
The composition of total transfers and the
changes in transfers as the household ages gives
some indication of which programs provide more in-
centives toward early retirement. In a country with a
social security system that has generous provisions
for early retirement, we expect to see the fraction of
social insurance (which includes social security pay-
ments) increase a lot for older households. In a coun-
try in which, instead, families retire early because of
incentives linked to private and public pension plans,
we expect the fraction of pension income to go up.
Tables 8 to 12 show that in Germany pensions
are lower than in all of the other countries for all age16 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 10
Age and income in Germany
Average Cash Social Means- Income
Age gross income Labor Business property insurance tested Pension Total tax
Income sources (%) Transfer sources (%)
25–29 31,747 87.7 1.7 0.3 4.9 3.7 0.0 10.3 13.4
30–34 39,949 85.8 7.1 0.9 4.0 1.4 0.0 6.2 15.0
35–39 45,944 81.3 10.0 2.3 4.6 1.3 0.0 6.5 15.2
40–44 48,523 78.7 12.0 2.7 4.3 1.7 0.0 6.6 16.0
45–49 53,947 79.4 11.6 3.1 3.4 1.9 0.1 5.9 18.5
50–54 62,911 82.7 5.2 7.0 3.3 1.0 0.6 5.2 23.7
55–60 45,906 81.4 3.4 3.7 8.9 0.9 1.2 11.4 16.3
Total 46,092 82.2 7.5 3.0 4.8 1.6 0.3 7.3 17.0
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for Germany, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
TABLE 8
Age and income in the U.S.
Average Cash Social Means- Income
Age gross income Labor Business property insurance tested Pension Total tax
25–29 28,550 89.4 3.1 1.6 1.9 2.6 0.2 6.0 12.9
30–34 37,454 88.7 4.7 1.4 2.0 2.0 0.3 5.2 14.0
35–39 44,985 86.2 6.2 2.7 2.0 1.5 0.4 4.9 16.0
40–44 48,808 85.6 6.6 3.1 2.2 1.1 0.6 4.8 16.4
45–49 54,959 84.2 7.1 3.8 2.5 0.8 1.0 4.9 17.5
50–54 54,156 81.2 7.0 5.0 3.0 0.9 2.3 6.8 17.5
55–60 49,589 75.4 6.2 7.2 3.6 0.8 6.1 11.2 17.8
Total 44,965 84.4 6.0 3.5 2.4 1.3 1.4 6.0 16.2
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for the U.S., Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
Income sources (%) Transfer sources (%)
TABLE 9
Age and income in Canada
Average Cash Social Means- Income
Age gross income Labor Business property insurance tested Pension Total tax
Income sources (%) Transfer sources (%)
25–29 28,707 84.0 4.1 0.9 6.6 3.2 0.2 10.9 18.9
30–34 34,120 82.0 6.4 1.1 6.8 2.4 0.3 10.5 20.3
35–39 37,227 82.8 6.1 1.1 6.7 1.9 0.4 10.0 20.8
40–44 40,909 82.5 7.6 1.5 5.4 1.6 0.4 8.3 21.9
45–49 43,849 82.1 6.6 2.4 5.4 1.4 0.8 8.9 21.5
50–54 44,607 81.9 6.0 2.3 5.3 1.6 1.4 9.8 21.4
55–60 38,593 69.1 7.3 4.4 6.9 2.0 7.4 19.2 20.2
Total 38,230 80.9 6.5 1.9 6.1 1.9 1.4 10.7 20.9
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994, dataset for Canada, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 11
Age and income in Sweden
Average Cash Social Means- Income
Age gross income Labor Business property insurance
a tested Total
b tax
Income sources (%) Transfer sources (%)
TABLE 12
Age and income in Finland
Average Cash Social Means- Income
Age gross income Labor Business property insurance tested Pension Total tax
Income sources (%) Transfer sources (%)
25–29 31,143 69.1 5.9 0.9 13.0 7.8 1.5 24.2 20.0
30–34 41,433 69.4 7.6 3.1 13.3 3.9 1.3 19.9 22.2
35–39 45,726 70.8 8.7 1.3 12.9 3.6 1.6 19.2 22.5
40–44 47,620 70.9 9.6 2.0 11.4 3.0 2.3 17.5 23.6
45–49 49,212 71.4 7.4 4.5 9.5 2.9 3.6 16.6 24.4
50–54 48,934 69.7 9.2 3.3 7.4 2.5 7.3 17.9 25.5
55–60 40,296 49.7 10.5 4.0 12.8 2.5 20.0 35.8 23.9
Total 43,851 68.0 8.5 2.8 11.3 3.5 5.0 20.7 23.4
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1995, dataset for Finland, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
25–29 38,037 71.2 1.2 2.4 19.8 4.8 25.2 23.2
30–34 44,806 71.5 1.6 2.6 19.3 3.7 24.3 22.6
35–39 51,529 72.9 2.3 3.4 17.0 3.1 21.4 23.6
40–44 54,982 75.9 2.4 3.8 14.9 2.1 17.9 24.8
45–49 58,375 80.2 2.8 3.8 11.2 1.4 13.2 26.7
50–54 56,943 79.9 2.9 4.1 12.1 0.8 13.1 27.6
55–60 51,329 70.3 2.8 4.8 21.5 0.6 22.2 28.1
Total 50,519 74.9 2.3 3.6 16.2 2.3 19.2 25.3
aSocial insurance transfers include public pensions.
bTotal, excluding private pensions.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, 1992, dataset for Sweden, Differdange, Luxembourg:
Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies.
groups. In particular, if we compare the 55 to 60 age
group, the fraction of gross income coming from
pensions is 1 percent in Germany, 6 percent in the
U.S., 7 percent in Canada, and a large 20 percent in
Finland. Social insurance, which includes social
security transfers, for the same age group represents
respectively, 9 percent of gross income in Germany,
4 percent in the U.S., 7 percent in Canada, and 13
percent in Finland. Correspondingly, German families
whose head is 55 to 60 are the ones with the highest
fraction of gross income coming from labor: 81 per-
cent, compared with a low of 50 percent in Finland.
These numbers reflect the fact that the German system
provides less incentive toward early retirement than
in the other countries. At the opposite extreme is the
Finnish system. In Finland, the fraction of gross
income due to labor drops from 70 percent at age 50
to 50 percent for age 55 to 60. However, the fraction
of income deriving from self-employment activities is
higher than in the other countries and is even higher
for older family heads. This indicates that in Finland
people retire early and devote part of their time to
self-employment.
As we discussed earlier, Sweden and Finland are
the countries with the most generous transfer systems
and highest average tax rates. We do not have data
for private pensions in Sweden, and public pensions
are included in social insurance. Looking at social
insurance transfers, we see that their fraction of gross
income increases from 12 percent at age 50 to 54
to 21 percent at age 55 to 60, while labor income
decreases from 80 percent to 70 percent. In Sweden
income from self-employment increases with age,
flattening out at 2.8 percent around age 45 to 49 and18 Economic Perspectives
APPENDIX
staying at that level. The available information for
Sweden suggests that there are some incentives to
retire early and that households do not supplement
their income through self-employment to the same
extent as our data suggest for Finland.
The U.S. and Canada seem to provide more incen-
tives to retire early than Germany, but much less than
Finland and Sweden. In both the U.S. and Canada, the
transfer component that increases the most for the
lowest or oldest income group is the pension compo-
nent. The effect is somewhat stronger in Canada than
in the U.S.
Conclusion
All of the various measures of income we look
at are unequally distributed across countries, and their
distributions are concentrated and skewed. The gov-
ernments of these five countries have some commit-
ment to reducing income inequality. However, they
go about this task with different intensities and they
use rather different tools to achieve it. The data for
the U.S. indicate less commitment to reducing income
inequality and a strong emphasis on progressive taxa-
tion as a redistribution device. Moreover, a large
portion of the transfers to the poorest segment of the
population are means tested.
Canada is quite close to the U.S., both in terms
of size of redistribution and instruments used, with
only slightly more emphasis on transfers.
Germany appears to focus on reducing labor
income inequality through other policies, with less
emphasis on taxes and transfers.
Sweden and Finland engage in substantial redis-
tribution of income, using high average tax rates, little
tax progressivity, and aggressive transfers. Sweden
uses mainly social insurance transfers, while Finland
relies a little more on means-tested transfers, but not
nearly as much as the U.S. and Canada.
Our results provide some useful lessons for pub-
lic policy. First, as we discussed in the introduction,
economic theory suggests that there is a tradeoff
between redistribution and efficiency: Transferring
more income to the poorer people tends to reduce
their work effort during their working years and may
induce them to retire early. In addition, it can distort
the economic decisions of those who are taxed to
provide the revenues that are being redistributed.
Second, there are theoretical reasons why the
distribution of labor income should depend on the tax
and transfer system, as well as on the distribution of
human capital. Human capital is linked to education,
which in turn is influenced by government subsidies.
Our research provides evidence that is consistent
with these theoretical propositions. It is interesting
to notice that, as a result of all of these forces, the
distribution of labor earnings in the countries that
traditionally are more concerned with redistribution
(Finland and Sweden) are not necessarily more equal
than the ones that belong to the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion of low government intervention (the U.S. and,
perhaps, Canada). Finland is one obvious example of
a country of high government intervention and high
labor income inequality. This is partly due to a more
pronounced pattern of early retirement in Finland
than in all of the other countries. Furthermore, Fin-
lands relatively generous unemployment benefits
may discourage job search and work effort. This
could translate into a larger number of unemployed or
underemployed, which increases measured inequality
in labor earnings.
Our findings are thus consistent with the predic-
tion from economic theory that greater redistribution
through taxes and transfers is achieved at the cost of
greater distortions on labor supply and early retire-
ment decisions.
Consistent with other theoretical work, we also
find that high redistribution countries rely heavily on
instruments other than income taxes, such as transfers
based on special conditions or means testing, to
achieve high levels of redistribution while keeping
distortions as low as possible for the beneficiaries.
This is costly because it generates the need to moni-
tor eligibility.
In Germany the level of redistribution through
taxes and transfers is low. However, the distribution
of labor earnings is remarkably more equal than in
all of the other countries we consider. Evidently, the
German government is using other instruments to
achieve this, possibly more equal access to public ed-
ucation. Another factor may be the presence of pow-
erful labor unions, which typically support a flat
wage structure that enhances security at the expense
of incentives.
The data
Because of either underreporting or lack of oversam-
pling of the rich, the people at the upper tail of the
earnings distribution are underrepresented in our
datasets. Income from self-employment and income
from interests and dividends are especially subject to
underreporting.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
For Germany and Finland, the original datasets
did not allow the reporting of negative earnings, and
set them to zero. To make our data more homoge-
neous across countries, we set negative earnings to
zero also for the other countries.
The U.S. dataset
The sampling frame for the survey consists of all
occupied housing units. The sampling frame is a
multistage stratified probability sample of the popu-
lation. Of the households participating in the survey
in 1979, 8 percent to 9 percent refused to answer any
of the income questions. If these cases are combined
with others for which responses to some but not all
income questions occurred, the item nonresponse
rate for income amounts averages about 15 percent.
Higher rates of missing responses were found for
self-employment income (33 percent) and property
income (25 percent). Imputation procedures were
used by the CPS to replace the nonresponse to the
question with an answer that was typical of other
households with similar characteristics. This imputa-
tion procedure partly corrects for the bias due to the
fact that nonrespondents have, on average, higher
levels of income than respondents.
The CPS also compared the aggregates derived
from the CPS dataset and the ones from the national
income account, and adjustments were made. Even
after the adjustments, property income (interest, divi-
dends, rent) and means-tested transfer income data
are of poor quality. Moreover, due to general non-
sampling errors at the upper tail of the income distri-
bution, very rich people are not well represented. The
number of observations for households whose head
is of working age (2560) in the 1994 wave that we
use is 41,871.
The Canadian dataset
The sampling frame includes all private dwell-
ings in the ten Canadian provinces. A stratified cluster
probability sample design was employed. In the 1987
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 20 percent of
individuals did not respond to income questions. The
missing values were imputed. Some specific income
items (for example, investment income sources and
some government transfers) were undercovered. The
top end of the income distribution curve was under-
represented in the sample. In the dataset that LIS de-
rived from the 1994 wave of the Canadian SCF, there
are 26,280 households whose head is of working age.
The German dataset
The sampling frame was given by the list of reg-
istered voters. The German Socio-Economic Panel
employs a two-stage stratified sample design. Adjust-
ments and corrections to the original dataset were
made to improve data quality. However, the dataset
still suffers from a relatively high number of missing
values. To get around this problem, we dropped the
households for which we did not have the informa-
tion on either earnings, income or disposable income
(about 8 percent of our sample). In the dataset that
LIS derived from the 1994 wave for Germany there
are 4,224 households whose head is of working age.
The Swedish dataset
The sampling frame for the Income Distribution
Survey is the taxation register for all individuals 18
years of age and older. A four-stage stratified sample
design was used. The sample design was used to con-
trol the sample size for farmers, employers, and pen-
sioners. Evaluations of the quality of these income
data were not performed and no corrections or ad-
justments were made to the original data. However,
since the data come from the taxation register, there
are no missing data for income. In the dataset that
LIS derived from this source, there are 8,720 house-
holds whose head is of working age.
The Finnish dataset
The sampling frame for the Finnish Income Dis-
tribution Survey is the taxation register for the total
population of household heads. As in the Swedish
dataset, there are no missing data for income. Some
population groups have been oversampled, such as
farmers, other entrepreneurs, and other high-income
groups. This is corrected through the weighting pro-
cedure. In the dataset derived by LIS from the 1995
wave there are data on 7,033 households.
1Stokey (1999) provides an overview of the literature on
intergenerational mobility in the U.S. She concludes that even in
the country considered the land of equal opportunity, children
from rich families have more chances for economic success than
children from poor families.
2See Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) for a theoretical model
estimated on the U.S. data, in which many of these elements in-
teract dynamically.
NOTES
3See, for example, Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
4Salary income includes all forms of cash wage and salary income,
including employer bonuses, gross of employee social insurance
contributions/taxes but net of employer contributions/taxes.
5Typically, a is chosen to be between 0 and 1. When a = 0 we get
back to the benchmark case we discuss throughout the article:20 Economic Perspectives
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